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Abstract: Threat intelligence helps businesses and organisations make the right decisions in their
fight against cyber threats, and strategically design their digital defences for an optimised and
up-to-date security situation. Combined with advanced security analysis, threat intelligence helps
reduce the time between the detection of an attack and its containment. This is achieved by
continuously providing information, accompanied by data, on existing and emerging cyber threats
and vulnerabilities affecting corporate networks. This paper addresses challenges that organisations
are bound to face when they decide to invest in effective and interoperable cybersecurity information
sharing and categorises them in a layered model. Based on this, it provides an evaluation of existing
sources that share cybersecurity information. The aim of this research is to help organisations improve
their cyber threat information exchange capabilities, to enhance their security posture and be more
prepared against emerging threats.
Keywords: cyber threat information; cyber threat intelligence; interoperability; cybersecurity;
evaluation
1. Introduction
Information has undoubtedly become one of the most valuable assets for organisations, and whose
dependence on it is constantly rising. At the same time, the frequency and ferocity of cyberattacks is
also increasing, posing a great threat to business environments. According to a study conducted jointly
by Ponemon Institute and Accenture, the average cost of cybercrime to the organisations in 2018 has
risen to $13.0M [1]. Moreover, 79% of Chief Information Security Officers in the Banking sector believe
that cybercriminals have become more sophisticated [2].
In this constant battle, organisations have to retain visibility of emerging and evolving threats and
defend themselves against a wide range of adversaries with various levels of motivations, capabilities
and access to resources. These adversaries typically range from amateur hackers to well-organised
and highly capable teams that have direct access to vulnerabilities and exploits, and therefore become
advanced, and sometimes persistent, threats to organisations. The impact of such sophisticated,
dynamic and automated cyberattacks can be devastating.
The community has recognised the need of being able to share Cyber Threat Information (CTI)
in a timely and reliable manner to enhance its ability to identify any malicious activity or sources
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and mitigate attacks in a timely manner, prior to damaging organisations’ assets. NIST [3] defines
CTI as “any information that can help an organization identify, assess, monitor, and respond to cyber
threats”. In a survey conducted by SANS regarding the evolution of cyber threat information [4],
72% of survey respondents mentioned that in 2018 they had produced or consumed such information
for their network defence. The respective percentage for 2017 was 60% [4]. This demonstrates that
information sharing is becoming part of the organisations’ strategy and the number of them that
join the sharing community is rising. The types of information that can be produced and shared
among communities include, among others, security appliances log entries and alerts, measurable
and observable actions, security bulletins and advisories, identified vulnerabilities, news, reports and
intelligent information.
The number of CTI sources is therefore increasing, as do cyber threat intelligence platforms
capable of consuming information from threat intelligence feeds, analysing, evaluating and classifying
it prior to sharing threat information with the community. Threat intelligence, according to the authors
of [5], means evidence-based knowledge representing threats that can inform decision-making. Cyber
Threat Information and Intelligence (CTII) facilitate situational awareness of the threat landscape, a
deeper understanding of threat actors and their Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), and greater
agility to defend against evolving threats.
Nowadays, organisations have the ability to participate in such threat-sharing communities or
intelligence groups, and analyse and evaluate CTII via their security operations team. Depending on
the types of security appliances they are using, they can incorporate CTII into their security solutions,
such as Unified Threat Management (UTM), Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) and
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM). IT security vendors and service providers also
collect such information from their clients worldwide, analyse it and feed it back to the deployed
security appliances, thus gaining from the experience of their community. Analysis and evaluation of
such information is considered essential, as sometimes the information that is shared is not properly
filtered or checked.
Using unreliable sources poses risks to the organisations, as the information may not be accurate
or complete. To confront this undesired situation, organisations go beyond closed groups and use
multiple sources instead. As such, CTII sharing takes place among multiple actors, such as government
agencies and organisations, private sector organisations and industry-focused groups. One of the
most challenging issues in this process is achieving consensus regarding how this information should
be shared among interested parties and the threat intelligence community. This requires having a
common understanding on what information is shared, how it is shared and whether its sharing is
law-abiding.
This paper addresses the interoperability challenges that the community faces when adopting
specific sharing solutions. These challenges mainly stem from the adoption of multiple technical
standards, strategies and policies among stakeholders, together with legal restrictions concerning
information sharing. The aim of this work is to highlight points that impede the wide adoption
of cyber security information sharing and the much-needed automation of the sharing process [4].
Security analysts would benefit from such automation, as they could devote more time on analysing
collected interoperable data, as opposed to devoting their efforts on the collection process itself.
Interoperability is also a means to widen the CTII sharing spectrum and engage more stakeholders
in the exchange process, thus developing a global shield against emerging threats, with significant
benefits for the community.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background information
about the exchange of cyber security information. Section 3 identifies the interoperability barriers in
CTII sharing and defines a model that comprises four interoperability layers. Section 4 provides an
analysis of a number of CTII sources with respect to their policy, semantic and syntactic interoperability
characteristics. Section 5 provides the conclusions and an outlook on future work.
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2. Background
Cybersecurity Information Exchange (CIE) concerns sharing CTII with third parties to help
organisations enhance their security posture and protect themselves from cyber threats. The main
motive is to create new knowledge or services about cyber threats, as well as to make cyber-defence
systems more effective and efficient.
CTI can be sometimes directly imported to security appliances, e.g., IP addresses reported as
malicious can be directly imported to firewalls and IDS/IPS, to speed up the organisation’s reaction to
a potential threat. This, however, may come at the cost of introducing many false positives as, after
an in-depth analysis and evaluation, these IPs may prove to be non-malicious. Therefore, prior to
becoming a valuable asset for the organisation, cyber threat information has to be properly collected
from various sources, correlated, analysed and evaluated to add significant value to the raw and/or
unevaluated data, thus producing the so-called “Cyber Threat Intelligence”. Analysed information
significantly reduces false positives and establishes trust on the various sources it comes from. The
downside of this process is the delay introduced to information sharing, due to the time-consuming
analysis of, e.g., big data as well as other techniques, like threat sandboxing, which is used for
monitoring the behaviour of suspicious targets.
The cooperation among organisations in the EU and the publication of detected security incidents
are also encouraged, although there are also cases where they are obligatory, as stated in the Directive
on security of Network and Information Systems (NIS) [6]. An implementation guidance for meeting
the requirements of the NIS Directive is provided by ETSI [7]. In this context, a Computer Security
Incident Response Team (CSIRT, also known as Computer Emergency Response Team – CERT) network
has been established which counts more than 400 members willing to share incidents and risk-related
information (an inventory of EU’s CSIRT Network members is maintained by ENISA [8]). The network,
however, is not restricted only to CSIRTs, but also includes commercial organisations, EU Institutions,
Law Enforcement Agencies, Private & Public Sector organisations, National and Military Agencies.
Similar initiatives in the US that promote the exchange of information include the US Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP) [9] and
the Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) [10].
Examples of such shareable information include the following.
• Indicators of Compromise (IOCs), i.e., system artefacts or observables that contain patterns, such
as malicious Internet Protocol addresses (IPs) or hashes of files containing malware, which can
help identify suspicious or malicious activity.
• Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), i.e., (detailed) description of the behaviour of an actor
that can assist operational activities, such as details of exploits and malware delivery mechanisms.
TTPs include tradecrafts, i.e., behaviour used to conduct a malicious activity, infrastructure
used to deliver malicious content or maintain command and control capabilities, and attackers’
intentions [11].
• Security alerts, i.e., notification, usually human-readable regarding security issues, such as
vulnerabilities.
• Threat intelligence reports, i.e., collections of threat intelligence for various topics, such as threat
actors, malware and attack techniques.
• Recommended security tool configurations, regarding automated collection and processing as
well as healing of identified security issues.
• Vulnerabilities, i.e., known weaknesses in software implementations or procedures, and
corresponding mitigations, such as security patches. Although in the information security
literature, vulnerabilities are not threats, they are considered as an important component in
the CTII sharing ecosystem.
CERT-UK together with the UK’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure define
four subtypes of threat intelligence in a whitepaper published by MWR Infosecurity [12]. A similar
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categorisation is also adopted by ENISA [13]. Based on the two schemes, stakeholders exchange
information of one of the following types.
• Strategic reports providing high level threat analyses that is consumed at board level or by other
senior decision-makers.
• Operational details providing information about impending attacks against an organisation.
• Advisories which include vulnerabilities, exploits patches and patch status, or high-level tactical
patterns of activity on a host, service, network or internet level, tools and methodologies.
• Indicators of compromise, which include IP addresses, DNS names, URLs, specific values
of format-specific fields (e.g., email headers), artefacts (e.g., hashes, registry and keys)
related to malware and sequences of low-level events (e.g., syscalls and packets) linked to
malicious behaviour.
• Low-level, i.e., network flow records and full packet captures, application logs, including typical
IDS alerts, samples of executable files, documents and email messages.
Depending on the type of information that is being shared, organisations have the capability for
prompt reaction, as a response to newly-emerged threats or vulnerabilities, for properly adapting their
security defences against changes in their situational awareness at a more tactical level and make more
strategic decisions on the allocation of their resources for upcoming threats.
The authors of [5] classify and distinguish existing threat intelligence types, focusing on technical
threat intelligence issues, emerging researches, trends and standards. They also explain why there is a
reluctance among organisations to share threat intelligence and provide sharing strategies that can
help overcome policy interoperability issues. In [14], following a layered model, the authors propose a
taxonomy to help classify existing threat-sharing standards and analyse interoperability. However,
the five layers proposed by the authors do not address legal or semantic issues that are analysed in
this paper.
So far, although CTII sharing is identified in the literature as an important issue, it is treated as a
problem that can be solved with the adoption of some technical standards [3,14,15]. To the best of the
authors’ knowledge, no work has been published so far for a holistic approach to the interoperability
problem in the CTII sharing.
3. Interoperable CTII Sharing
CTII information is generated and shared among devices and organisations that typically have
well-established procedures to appropriately handle personal and classified information found within.
When CTII is about to be shared, especially with external entities, several interoperability and security
issues have to be confronted, which can be categorised into the four layers depicted in Figure 1 and
that are further analysed in the following sections.
Legal
• Restrictions on what to share
• Obligations to share
• Data Privacy
Policy & 
Procedures
• Organization objectives and instructions
• Business interest
• Recipients
Semantic & 
Syntactic
• Unambiguous meaning
• Data types and formats
Technical • Data transmission and protection 
Figure 1. Cyber Threat Information and Intelligence (CTII) exchange interoperability layers.
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3.1. Legal Interoperability
Legal interoperability is about ensuring that the legal frameworks under which organisations
operate and provide services are aligned and do not impede the sharing of CTII. Legal frameworks
open up the potential for improving the collaboration among public–private organisations and may
encourage or require the sharing of cyber threat information. Examples of such frameworks are the
EU’s NIS Directive [6] and the US Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) of 2015.
Legal constraints may also prohibit or restrict the uncontrolled sharing of CTII. Examples of the
latter are any personally identifiable information (PII) that may be part of the shared sightings, such as
usernames of entities that have been identified as sources of malicious activity and restrictions that
stem from the corresponding telecommunications privacy legal framework. One of the main legal
restrictions arises from the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [16] and relates to any PII
shared with external entities without the user’s consent. CTII sharing with external entities should not
impact privacy and sharing parties must take measures to properly anonymise or pseudonymise any
records of data that could otherwise be used to identify individuals.
Liability is another key factor that has to be considered when sharing information. Organisations
have to take into account that they may be liable for any damage caused to stakeholders or entities
that appear to be threat actors, by sharing information that may prove inaccurate or false. For instance,
what would happen if an IDS/IPS falsely identified some malicious activity coming from a popular
website and this was immediately reported to sharing parties?
Legal interoperability is even more important when data sharing spans multiple countries or
legal domains. Therefore, restrictions imposed by each such domain must be carefully reviewed prior
to information dissemination. The organisation has to establish boundaries on any sharing activities
so that these will not infringe any legal restrictions.
Legal interoperability requires visibility control over CTII. The organisation has to have the means
to perform deep inspection on what is practically going to be shared to identify any information that
may cross the well-established boundaries regarding information sharing, and this should be reflected
to the policies and procedures adopted by the organisation.
3.2. Policies and Procedures for Interoperability
Organisations’ information sharing policies and procedures are formal statements that reflect
the organisation’s objectives and detailed instructions to achieve these objectives respectively. They
are typically part of the organisation’s information security policy and has to be endorsed by the
organisation’s top management.
Among the issues that the organisation has to consider at the Policy layer when deciding to share
CTII, are the 5 Ws and 1 H that have to be answered prior to start sharing, as depicted in Figure 2.
The policy should clearly address them, while well-established procedures and appropriate robust
measures will properly support them to avoid policy violations, such as the leakage of classified or
sensitive information. Therefore, to ensure that the security and privacy posture of the organisation is
not negatively affected by the introduction of CTII sharing, the service’s risk analysis should address
the threats that are associated with the exchange of CTII with third parties and the consumption of the
received information. The deployed security measures that will protect CTII and ensure that this is
handled only by authenticated and authorised entities will minimise the associated risks.
The adopted procedures should facilitate information sharing according to the organisation’s
strategy and policy and should not be an impediment to the accurate, fast and secure exchange of
high quality information. Organisations’ policies may also be driven by security-related standards
that address the sensitive issue of information sharing, such as the ISO 27010:2015 [17], which
provides guidance on managing information within sharing communities and therefore facilitates
trust establishment among stakeholders. Trust establishment with stakeholders is the foundation in
CTII sharing and should be mainly addressed in the context of the “Who to share it with” question.
A methodology that can be used for evaluating CTII sources based on quantitative parameters is
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proposed in [18]. The methodology is based on a weighted evaluation method that allows each entity
to adapt it to its own needs and priorities.
CIE
Why to 
share
Where 
to use 
When 
to share
How to 
share
What to 
share
Who to 
share 
with
Figure 2. The 5 Ws and 1 H of CIE policy.
In the context of formulating its policy and procedures, an organisation may consider adopting
a cybersecurity sharing framework for managing cyber threat information, which set provisions
for information sharing and exchange. There are several frameworks and programs adopted and
supported by governments or the industry, like the US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)
Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) [10] and Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program
(CISCP) [9], which is more focused on critical infrastructure sectors, the standardised Cybersecurity
Information Exchange Framework (CYBEX) [19], the Malware Information Sharing Platform
(MISP—https://www.misp-project.org/), as well as proposed frameworks, like the Cybersecurity
Information Exchange with Privacy (CYBEX-P) which also addresses data privacy and classified data
management issues [20].
Data sanitisation [21] is one of the solutions that the organisations should consider utilising to
ensure that no classified or sensitive information is disclosed to unauthorised entities while sharing
CTII with external entities. In this context, the organisation should carefully review and classify the
information that their security appliances use and report (e.g., logs from IDS/IPS), and ensure that no
information violating the organisation’s policy is accidentally shared using CIE tools. For example, the
CIE solution should not disclose the internal IP that has been reported by the IDS/IPS as a target of
malicious activity.
Sharing of information, if not public, should be driven by agreements among the sharing parties,
which address policy restrictions. Such agreements should address, among others, the following
issues [22].
• The type of information that satisfies the organisations’ business needs.
• The form of information exchange that is going to take place, such as emails, bulletins, documents
and automated sharing.
• The confidentiality requirements for the exchanged information and the dissemination restrictions.
• Parties authorised to access, process and use the information.
• Technical standards used for the exchange of information to satisfy the syntactic and semantic
interoperability.
• Language issues for cross-border dissemination.
• Communication protocols and access to services.
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One of the means that security organisations utilise to control access to the CTII they produce
and process is licensing agreements. Several agreement schemes can be adopted by the organisation
depending on its business model and needs, as well as the types of services provided to consumers and
third parties. Schemes that enforce restricted use include, but are not limited to, commercial licenses,
academic or research and personal use. Other licenses may be related to information reuse options
and further dissemination of this information to third parties or other communities. For example,
several vendors build their own communities, where information collected by their deployed security
appliances is properly analysed, evaluated and disseminated back to their customers.
Policies can be technically supported by the use of specific protocols, such as the Traffic Light
Protocol (TLP) [23] and the Information Exchange Policy (IEP) [24] that can semantically support the
unambiguous transfer of policy rules among sharing parties, as explained in the following section.
3.3. Semantic and Syntactic Interoperability
Semantics are introduced to convey the necessary meaning for syntactically correct messages.
Although in the CTII sharing process sources may disseminate unstructured information that hinder
data processing (such as information found on social media, news or even on CERT and CSIRTs),
several standards have been introduced for properly exchanging CTII among stakeholders. Compliance
with standards facilitates the automated sharing of information as well as the ingestion, analysis
and integration. Although the existence of a small set of standards facilitates interoperability,
adopting a wide variety of competing non-interoperable ones, introduces significant overhead and can
eventually hinder the exchange of information. The most prominent standards in the CTII sharing are
the following.
• Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) [25]: This OASIS adopted standard is an
information model and serialization solution used to exchange CTII. STIX 2.X is based on JSON,
while its predecessors, i.e., STIX 1.X were XML-based. STIX 1.X together with the CybOX 2.X [26],
a standardised language for encoding and communicating information about cyber observables,
were integrated into STIX 2.0.
• Malware Information Sharing and Threat Intelligence Sharing Platform (MISP) [27]: A data model
composed of “events”, which usually represent threats or incidents, which in turn are composed of
a list of “attributes”, such as IP addresses and domain names. Objects in MISP allow combinations
of attributes and “galaxies”, which enable a deeper analysis and categorisation of events.
• Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [28]: It provides a
comprehensive dictionary of known patterns of attack employed by adversaries to exploit
known weaknesses.
• Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC) [29]: A structured language used
for encoding and sharing information about malware based upon attributes such as behaviours,
artefacts and relationships between malware samples. It facilitates correlation, integration, and
automation of malware analysis and reduces potential duplication of malware during analysis.
• IETF’s Managed Incident Lightweight Exchange (MILE) set of standards: MILE working group
develops standards to support computer and network security incident management focusing on
the definition of data formats for representing incident and indicator data, and on standardising
how application layer protocols such as HTTPS and XMPP are utilised for sharing the structured
data. Among the standards adopted by MIME are the following.
– IODEF v2 (Incident Object Description Exchange Format) [30,31]: It is an XML-based data
representation of security incident reports and indicators. It is designed so that to be
compatible with IDMEF (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format) and capable to
include IDMEF message into incident objects.
– Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) [32]: An XML-based data format that
is used by intrusion detection and response systems to report alerts about suspicious events.
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A comparison of the above CTII sharing technologies with respect to the data format and the
types of data they can support is provided in Table 1.
Table 1. CTII technologies characteristics.
Technology Format Type of Data
STIX1.x XML TTP, Threat Actor, Incident, Exploit Target, Course of Action, Report, Package
STIX2.x JSON
Attack Pattern, Campaign, Course of Action, Identity, Indicator,
Intrusion Set, Malware, Observed Data, Report, Threat Actor,
Tool, Vulnerability, Sighting
MISP JSON
Sighting, Threat Actor, Incident, Network Activity, Antivirus Detection,
Hashes, Malware Sample, External Analysis, Traffic Light Protocol
CAPEC XML Attack Pattern, Cross Site Forgery, SQL Injection, Buffer Overflow
MAEC JSON Malware, Cyber Observable, Entity Association, Incident Management
IODEFv2 XML/HTML Incident Management, Hashes, Indicator
IDMEF XML IP Addresses, Malware, Alert, (Login, Date of Creation, Classification)
The latest version of STIX (2.x) is defined using JSON schemas, thus rendering it easier to parse
and expand than its XML-based predecessor (STIX 1.x). CAPEC is supported in both STIX 1.x, as an
instance type, and STIX 2.x, as an external reference for the Attack Pattern object type.
STIX and MAEC were designed based on similar use cases. Despite their similarities, they differ
in the level of description. MAEC is intended to provide a comprehensive, structured way of capturing
detailed information regarding malware samples, whereas STIX is meant to capture a broad spectrum
of cyber threat information, including basic information on malware in a more conceptual framework.
An analysis of the types of malware-related information that can be captured by MAEC, STIX and
MAEC embedded in STIX is presented in [33].
STIX 2.x does not provide support for MAEC content. As a result, STIX 2.x cannot describe a
malware in as much detail as STIX 1.x [34]. Nevertheless, STIX 2.1 will include a new object type called
malware-analysis which could possibly include MAEC content [35].
Some of the aforementioned standards, such as STIX 2.0 and MISP, also support data markings
which can facilitate enforcement of policies regarding the sharing of information to achieve technical
and semantic interoperability, such as the following.
• Statements, e.g., copyright, terms of use, applied to the shared content.
• Traffic Light Protocol (TLP v1.0) [23]: It is a set of designations used to ensure that sensitive
information is shared with the appropriate audience by providing four options as shown in
Figure 3. Although optimised for human readability and person-to-person sharing and not for
automated sharing exchanges, TLP can help restrict information sharing only with specific entities
or platforms and avoid any further unnecessary or unauthorised dissemination thereof. TLP is
supported by STIX 2.0 and MISP protocols.
 
TLP: RED – Not for disclosure, restricted to 
participants only.
TLP: AMBER – Limited disclosure, restricted to 
participants’ organizations.
TLP: GREEN – Limited disclosure, restricted to the 
community.
TLP: WHITE – Disclosure is not limited.
Figure 3. The Traffic Light Protocol (TLP).
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TLP, however, cannot support fine-grained policies. Considering this limitation, FIRST developed
Information Exchange Policy (IEP) [24], a JSON-based framework that content producers can use to
specify restrictions for threat intelligence regarding the following:
• Handling: It can be used to ensure the confidentiality of the information being shared.
• Action: It can be used to define the permitted actions or uses of the information received that can
be carried out by a recipient.
• Sharing: It can be used to define any permitted redistribution of information that is received.
• Licensing: It can be used to define any applicable agreements, licenses or terms of use that govern
the information being shared.
Some of the aforementioned standards were developed to cover the needs for sharing cyber
threat-related information, like incidents, patterns and indicators, and not vulnerabilities, which can
be considered as a type of information that has its own needs and sets of standards for dissemination,
such as the ones listed below.
• Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE): A de facto standard for listing vulnerability
information where each CVE entry should include:
– A CVE ID number,
– A description of the vulnerability,
– The anticipated impact in the form of a CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System)
value, and
– References to vulnerabilities reports and/or advisories.
• Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework (CVRF) [36]: An XML-based standard that supports
creation, update and interoperable exchange of security advisories as structured information
on products, vulnerabilities and the status of impact and remediation among interested parties.
According to MITRE, CVRF allows interested parties to download the entire CVE list at once, or
download CVEs for a specific year, whereas each CVE can record when it was initially published
by the CVE Team, and when it was most recently modified.
• Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL): A language that can be used for
representing system information, expressing specific machine states, and reporting the results of
an assessment.
3.4. Technical Interoperability
Technical interoperability is much related to the implementation of the necessary tools and APIs
to support the automated exchange of information, which includes both consumption and delivery, as
well as the support of the underlying communication protocols used for conveying CTII information.
It typically involves many layers of the TCP/IP stack in formulating and transferring these messages,
yet the anticipated approach towards interoperable solutions is the adoption of well-established
standardised protocols that can be easily supported by the communicating parties.
Protocols that have been proposed for the transmission of CTII include the following (please
note that in this paper we do not consider typical TCP/IP protocols including those found at the
application layer).
• Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information (TAXII) [37]: It is an application layer
protocol that is used to exchange CTII, represented in STIX, over HTTPS.
• Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange (ROLIE) [38]: It defines a REST style
approach for security information publication, discovery and sharing. Using ROLIE, security
incidents, attack indicators, software vulnerabilities, configuration checklists, and other security
automation information are provided as web-addressable resources. IETF’s MILE working
Computers 2020, 9, 18 10 of 17
group has drafted two extensions to ROLIE for CSIRTs needs [39] and for the exchange of
vulnerabilities [40].
Other technical issues that have to be considered during sharing are related to the protection of
information against unauthorised disclosure or modification, the mechanisms that are used thereof
and the corresponding cryptographic algorithms.
4. The CTII Landscape
The CTII sharing community comprises a number of sources that disseminate information based
on their respective strategy and policy. In this section, an analysis of CTII sources with respect to
their interoperability characteristics is presented; it focuses on the semantic standards adopted by the
parties, as well as the Licensing options and demonstrates the diversified approaches followed by them.
Entities that want to join the CTII community or, most importantly, utilise the information provided
by its members, have to consider these diversities to appropriately consume from the community or
contribute to it.
The authors have studied a large number of threat intelligence sources, including those that
provide high-level information, such as CERTs and conducted an analysis on interoperability-related
characteristics of 32 of them. These sources are listed in Appendix A, whereas a listing of the
characteristics that were used in the analysis is provided in Appendix B. Sources providing only
vulnerabilities, such as the NIST NVD, MITRE and CVEDetails, have been excluded from this study,
as the focus was more on threat sharing information, i.e., indicators, sightings, hashes, as opposed
to vulnerability sharing. In [41] there is an extended list and analysis of those sources that provide
vulnerabilities. Moreover, although an analysis of multiple National CERTs could be conducted, the
authors have intentionally omitted this as the majority of National CERTs adopt similar, if not the
same approaches in information sharing. As a result, only Finland’s National CERT is included in the
analysis as an example.
The 32 sources that are analysed in this paper include original data providers, data aggregators,
intelligence platforms and report providers, the number of which is shown in Figure 4. The analysis
demonstrates the diversities in the CTII sharing landscape, where the majority of the sources choose to
share information based on generic standards. JSON and CSV were chosen by 50% an 31% of sources,
respectively, whereas another 59% of them chose plaintext, as shown in Figure 5. Unfortunately, only
a small set of sources have chosen to invest on the set of CTII-oriented standards, like STIX, MISP
and OpenIOC.
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Figure 4. Providers’ classification.
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Figure 5. CTII sources supported formats.
The sources that have adopted the various formats are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Sources supporting semantic/syntactic formats.
Semantic/Syntactic Formats Sources
STIX1 CRITs, MISP Platform, OTX AlienVault, US CERT AIS
STIX2 Abuse.ch, Anomali STAXX, MISP Platform
MISP MISP Platform
TAXII Anomali STAXX, CRITs, OTX AlienVault, US CERT AIS
JSON
Block List Project, CINSscore, Dshield, Fortinet,
Google Safebrowsing, Hybrid Analysis, Malc0de, MalShare,
MISP Platform, OpenPhish, OTX AlienVault, PhishTank,
Proofpoint, Shadowserver, ThreatMiner, VirusTotal
CSV
Abuse.ch, Autoshun, MISP Platform, OpenPhish,
OTX AlienVault, PhishTank, Proofpoint,
Shadowserver, Spamhaus, ThreatMiner
XML Fortinet, Hybrid Analysis, PhishTank
OpenIOC MISP Platform, OTX AlienVault
Plain Text
Abuse.ch, Bambenek, Bitdefender (Advanced Threat Intelligence),
Block List Project, BruteForceBlocker, CERT-EU, CINSscore,
Comodo Site Inspector, DNS8, Dshield, ESET, Fortinet, Malc0de,
MalShare, National CERTs (CERT-FI), OpenPhish, Spamhaus,
TalosIntelligence, Trustwave
RSS CERT-EU
Moreover, the majority of the sources provide information only in one or two formats, as shown
in Figure 6, which are generic JSON and CSV formats and not CTII sharing related ones. This generally
hinders interoperability.
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Figure 6. Formats supported by cybersecurity sources.
The analysis has also demonstrated that 15 out of the 32 analysed sources provide open, publicly
available information (see Figure 7). Moreover, information reuse for personal use is allowed by 13
of them.
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Figure 7. Licensing options for the studied sources.
Another interesting characteristic that the analysis revealed is the number of sources that provide
an API, such as REST, that can be used to easily consume the provided information, as shown in
Figure 8. These sources are listed in Table 3.
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Figure 8. Sources supporting API.
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Table 3. Sources supporting API.
API Support Sources
Provides API
Abuse.ch, Autoshun, Bitdefender (Advanced Threat Intelligence, CRITs, Dshield, ESET,
Fortinet, Google Safebrowsing, Hybrid Analysis, Malshare, MISP Platform,
OTX AlienVault, PhishTank, Threat Miner, Virus Total
5. Conclusions
The need for sharing information about cyber threats has been established by the cyber security
community as a means for timely and effective protection against the aforementioned threats. The
main requirements are sharing to be performed using a structured format (so as to be machine readable
and facilitate automated actions) and have the ability to provide as much context as possible for a
given threat. Nevertheless, interoperability among cyber threat sources is not related only to technical
issues. This paper has proposed a layered interoperability model which addresses all those factors that
can affect the exchange of cybersecurity information among stakeholders. The research conducted
based on this model, has proven that there is significant diversity in the way cyber security information
gets shared by the involved sources. This approach directly impacts interoperability both from the
perspectives of sharing it and/or consuming it, and also makes it harder for security analysts to
effectively extract knowledge.
Future work could involve the development of an interoperability maturity model that will guide
stakeholders towards the development of interoperable CTII sharing solutions, or the adaptation of
their existing ones. Improving the interoperability of cyber security information sharing will facilitate
more effective protection against cyber threats in the future.
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Appendix A
The appendix provides a listing (in alphabetical order) of the sources that have been analysed in
this work.
Table A1. CTII sources.
Source URL
Abuse.ch http://abuse.ch/
Anomali STAXX https://www.anomali.com/community/staxx
Autoshun https://www.autoshun.org
Bambenek https://www.bambenekconsulting.com/
Block List Project https://blocklist.site/
Bitdefender (Advanced Threat Intelligence) https://www.bitdefender.com/
BruteForceBlocker http://danger.rulez.sk/index.php/bruteforceblocker/
CERT-EU https://cert.europa.eu/cert/filteredition/en/CERT-
LatestNews.html/
http://cinsscore.com/ http://cinsscore.com/
Collaborative Research Into Threats
(CRITs)
https://crits.github.io/
Comodo Site Inspector http://siteinspector.comodo.com/
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DNS8 https://www.layer8.pt/products/dns8/
DShield https://www.dshield.org/
ESET https://www.eset.com
Fortinet https://www.fortinet.com/
Google Safebrowsing https://safebrowsing.google.com/
Hybrid Analysis https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/
Malc0de http://malc0de.com/
Malshare https://malshare.com/
MISP Platform https://www.misp-project.org/
National Certs (NCSC-FI example) https://www.cybersecurityintelligence.com/national-
cyber-security-centre-finland-ncsc-fi-1916.html
OpenPhish https://openphish.com
OTX AlienVault https://otx.alienvault.com/
PhishTank https://www.phishtank.com/
Proofpoint https://www.proofpoint.com/us/daily-ruleset-
update-summary
Shadowserver https://www.shadowserver.org/
Spamhaus https://www.spamhaus.org/
TalosIntelligence https://talosintelligence.com
Threat Miner https://www.threatminer.org/
Trustwave (SpiderLabs Blog) https://www.trustwave.com
US DHS - Automated Indicator Sharing https://www.cisa.gov/automated-indicator-sharing-ais
Virus Total https://www.virustotal.com
Appendix B
This appendix provides a listing of the characteristics that have been used for the analysis that
was made for the sources identified in Appendix A, which adopts the approach followed in [18]. The
analysis did not consider vulnerability sharing sources. It rather focused on the resources that share
indicators and sightings.
Table A2. CTII sources characteristics.
Generic Properties Explanation
1. Type of Data A CTII source may manage and share different types of data, ranging from
vulnerabilities and exploits to sightings and courses of actions
1.1 Indicators An indicator is a collection of cyber security relevant information containing
patterns that can be used to detect suspicious or malicious cyber activity.
1.2 Sightings A sighting is an observation that someone has shared with the community,
without adding additional intelligence to it.
1.3 Courses of
Action
A course of action is information concerning how to prevent or mitigate an
event shared by, e.g., an indicator.
1.4 Vulnerabilities A vulnerability is a weakness in a hardware or software appliance that could
be exploited to breach the appliance.
2 Provider
Classification
An indicator to assess the type of sharing an information sharing provider
does, and how much original information can be expected from this provider.
2.1 Data Feed
Provider
A data feed provider is the entity that produces cyber security information,
or shares received information with minimal or no additional intelligence
added to it.
2.1.1 Provides
Original Data
A data feed provider that is the original provider of this information, which
has been shared in one form or another by the source of, e.g., an incident.
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2.1.2 Provides
Aggregated Data
A feed provider that does not provide information originally shared with
this provider, but shares information aggregated from other feeds.
2.2 Intelligence
Platform
A provider that adds additional intelligence/ analysis to the information that
is shared with the provider in one form or another.
2.3 Report Provider A provider that provides, e.g., statistical information in form of reports rather
than data feeds.
3 Licencing Options An indicator to assess the licencing of data use and/or access to the data
source API.
3.1 Open (Publicly
available)
The data is freely available to collect and use.
3.2 Restricted use Some restrictions apply as to how the data can be used (e.g. academic or
commercial context).
3.3 Commercial The data provider has commercial interest and provides the data for a fee.
3.4 Information
Reuse
Specifies how the data provided by a data source can be reused. Options
include commercial, academic or personal use.
3.4.1 Commercial
use allowed
The data can be reused in a commercial context, offering services and
collecting fees based on this data is allowed.
3.4.2 Academic use
allowed
The data can be used in an academic context without restrictions, restrictions
apply in other contexts.
3.4.3 Personal use
allowed
The data can be used for personal use without restrictions, restrictions apply
for other contexts.
4 Interoperability/
Standards
An indicator to assess the interoperability of a tool provider with state-of-the
art cybersecurity threat exchange standards and relevant tools/libraries.
4.1 STIX1 Supports the STIX1 threat expression standard.
4.2 STIX2 Supports the STIX2 threat expression standard.
4.3 MISP Supports the MISP threat exchange protocol.
4.4 TAXII Supports the TAXII threat exchange protocol standard.
4.5 JSON Supports the JSON protocol data exchange format.
4.6 CSV Supports the CSV data expression standard.
4.7 XML Supports the XML-based threat exchange.
4.8 OpenIOC Supports the OpenIOC cybersecurity artefact description standard.
4.9 Plain Text Supports plain text data expression.
4.10 RSS Supports the RSS feed standard.
5 Advanced API Indicates whether a data source supports or enables relevant advanced API
features.
5.1 Supports API The source implements an API, such as REST.
5.2 Filtering based
on time
Supports filtering based on time for data access. Relevant for data collection
to only collect entries since last access.
5.3 Filtering based
on content
Supports filtering based on content. Relevant for context specific data
collection.
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